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Everybody wants to get a good review but not everybody is willing to give a good review. In my experience, this fact 
has resulted in a modern-day instance of “the tragedy of the commons” in which everyone seeks a precious common 
resource (in this case, the scholarship of peer review in scientific publication) but everyone less widely provides it. 
Editors face an emerging review culture in which many qualified colleagues often seem too busy, too disinterested, or 
simply too inaccessible to engage with for peer review purposes, and which leads to issues that are, indeed, tragic in 
the practice of science. 
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The tragedy of the commons is an economic theory of a situation within a shared-resource 
system where individual users acting independently according to their own self-interest 
behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting or spoiling that resource 
through their collective action. (“Tragedy of the commons”, n.d.) 
1 Introduction 
In Hardin's (1968) classic “The Tragedy of the Commons”, the eponymous “commons” refers to a 
resource that many individuals share (e.g., the old English common green, where one and all could freely 
graze their flock). The “shared” aspect of the common resource means that individuals can use a portion 
of the resource for their own benefit and at no cost since it is a “common good”. 
This notion represents a classic one in economics, philosophy, and rational human decision making. The 
concept describes the need for numerous individuals to wisely share and apportion a finite but prized 
economic resource that they all wish to use. The problem, though, lies in the base nature of humanity; we 
all want the maximum good (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244), but we all unwilling to share equally to reach that 
end. As is only typically human, some individuals might want to freely consume without considering the 
need to replenish the source (e.g., Barker, Barclay, & Reeve, 2012). Such seems often to be the case in 
scientific research reviewing. As I have written before (see Stafford, 2016), everyone wants to receive a 
good review when they submit their own research for potential publication, but not everyone who receives 
a good review also wants to provide a good review when asked to serve as a jurist on someone else’s 
study. Such is the tragedy of the scientific commons so to speak.  
2 Give and Get versus Get but not Give  
As an economic problem, when every individual tries to reap the greatest benefit from a given resource 
without considering others’ needs, and, when the demand for the resource overwhelms the supply, every 
individual who consumes an additional unit directly harms others who can no longer enjoy the benefits 
(Investopedia, n.d.). So-called “rational man” economic theories (Simon, 1955) speak to the underlying 
aspects of human economic rationality that are oriented toward the human tendency to seek to maximize 
personal outcomes against all other considerations in a given situation (Smith, 1937). However, while the 
classical assumption of the tragedy of the commons is that the overall effect of combined individual 
economic rationality would be the “invisible hand” of overall good, Hardin’s classic essay pointed out the 
error in that presumption.   
Such seems to be the case with peer reviewing in our modern practice of information systems research 
publishing. As an editor, I am frequently faced with reluctant denial in the face of urgent requests for 
expert review. Authors who have surely benefited from others’ generous and considered review 
services—which their notable academic successes in the leading journals evidence—seem reluctant to 
lend their own expertise to others’ work (a case of “get but not give”). As Hardin would put it, the commons 
have become overgrazed and we are running out of resources (i.e., reviewers).  
3 Cases in Point  
In terms of the availability of skilled colleagues for peer review, I suspect that, in a sense, success 
becomes its own worst enemy. I see a trend of young rising stars who often give when asked juxtaposed 
against established, eminent professors who cannot respond owing to the other duties that come with 
such eminence. I worry about the rising stars because success leads to busier itineraries and agendas, 
which have the potential to prevent them from continuing their generous contributions to peer review once 
they become eminent.  
Consider the case of “A”, a young star with truly impressive methodological and authorial skills against 
“B”, an established scholar of even more impressive credentials. “A”, when asked to serve as referee on a 
highly specialized manuscript submitted to my journal, cheerfully agreed to add this review task to the 
additional burden of what I can easily see is an already considerable service load, whereas “B”, when 
reached in regards to a similar review request, indicated a willingness to assist if only I could wait until the 
end of the semester while the scholar dealt with other, more pressing duties.  
As for “A”, I urgently needed theoretical expertise that one can rarely find in our field, and I asked “A” out 
of desperation since I only had one other qualified contact (not even a member of our field) that I could 
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call on for theoretical help (call this one “Z”) to substitute for the scarce resource “A” owned access to. As 
for “B” who could not respond in a manner that fit my timeframe, I did end up calling on my outside contact 
“Z” to fulfill my assignment—that is, editing an important theoretical contribution to the literature that 
required expert peer review from scholars who had rare theoretical expertise. “Z” agreed on the strength 
of our long-time friendship, I suspect, seeing that his role as a research dean tended to connote a rather 
heavy service load already.  
“A” is on the way to great success, and, as such, will always (I hope given his considerable, rare, and 
prized theoretical expertise) respond in the affirmative when I ask for an increase to the already existing 
service peer-review load. “B” already has had great success but no longer has time for the review system 
that led to it; tragically, economic self-rationality has instantiated the tragedy of the commons in this case. 
“Z” is a theoretical genius but works in a different scholarly field that has its own commons to consider; 
nonetheless, and despite his busy administrative duties in the position he currently holds, he agreed to 
help me even though he gained little of practical value from it as a contributor to a non-allied scholarly 
field. “Z” is giving back to a commons he does not even graze.  
The scientific tragedy of the commons resides in these details: those who will help despite the increasing 
load of work and the seeming economic non-rationality of scientific altruism and those who cannot be 
bothered and have reached the critical mass of stardom on the backs of the resource that the commons 
provides to facilitate such success. While an isolated example, I use it to illustrate the tragic outcomes that 
occur when people overconsume a finite and prized resource (peer review), but any reader here would 
readily recognize the latent and inherent tendencies in themselves as well. I am no exception: I hate when 
I find myself actually thinking, “I can’t do this review, I just don’t have the time”, when, in fact, I would not 
be where I am if it were not for some several other generous anonymous reviewers who decided, “What 
the heck, it's a lot of work, but I'll do it anyway!”. It's a common tragedy among researchers these days to 
find the ones who say “I don't have time” more often than we do the ones who will altruistically make the 
time for the sake of science despite the added workload. That said, we editors frequently acknowledge 
that the time it takes to secure capable reviewers for the papers submitted to our journals constitutes one 
of the key logistical and operational problems we face in “keeping the train running on time” (Brown, 
2012). Anybody who shares a care for the “cycle time problem” of peer reviewing should recognize this 
scarcity of resources in considering the causes, effects, and solutions to the problem.  
4 The Limits on Common (Research) Goods 
One can justify the commons only in conditions of low population density (Hardin, 1968, p. 1248). As 
such, in early days of our admittedly still young field, it was endurable for authors to submit and expect 
reviews while not accommodating requests themselves for review service from publication venues. Those 
who consumed review services did not create an imbalance against those who might be willing to provide 
review services at that point. A relatively small number of authors and journals sought the field’s review 
services in its early days. However, as our field grows and an amazing new crop of journals arises to 
accommodate that growth, the economic “good” we as editors and authors seek in peer reviewing is in 
increasingly short supply as more and more authors and increasing numbers of journals all seek to serve 
peer-reviewed science. In the scenario with an overpopulated commons, those who consume without 
contributing inevitably denigrate the public good to the eventual point where it no longer represents a good 
at all.  
I have mused on this conundrum for most of my editorial life, and I have found it problematic to one 
degree or another throughout that time, which means that the commons of peer review in our young field 
has long since been overgrazed so to speak. Some solutions have presented themselves to me, but none 
really fit well with the culture of scientific publishing in the information systems world, but readers should 
know that “pay for play” has worked superbly in other fields that are more established and further down 
the road of economic rationality in regard to the peer-review problem than our own.  
Economics and finance researchers, for example, routinely expect to pay hefty submission fees when 
sending their best work to important journals in their field. It can cost an author hundreds of dollars to 
submit article paper to a journal of note in those fields and the same fee yet again each time they resubmit 
it in the revision process should one be so lucky. The editors in those fields share part of that fee in the 
form of honoraria for the reviewers who serve to support the research publication process. Interestingly, 
reviews in those fields come back to the editors quickly and are generally excellent. They are clearly 
getting what they pay for—as are the submitting authors. I stop short of proposing such a change for our 
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field because I have always felt that science was service and because we are all paid in advance in part 
for our service in addition to the teaching and research that we do. Hence, one could see that the bill 
accruing to our review work has already been presented and paid and that some of us simply do not earn 
our paycheck in that regard by shirking review requests.  
But, perhaps, I tilt at windmills; conventional wisdom in our world is that service and teaching do not earn 
one tenure, though a significant lack of such might serve to prevent it. Publishing research constitutes the 
coin of our realm, and the increasingly scarcer willing peer reviewer serves as the necessary support for 
achieving that important tenure-yielding end. 
5 The Work of the Editors, The World of the Reviewers  
I feel that I myself am also an available good as it were. Even though I occasionally have initial thoughts of 
“I'm too busy” when asked to review, I always recover with a reminder to myself that, “If I don’t, then who 
will?”. But, my friends and colleagues, I am only an army of one in that regard, I fear. For some strange 
reason that I cannot even well rationalize to myself, I decided early in my career as a scientist that I 
wanted to excel at editing journals, and that is the direction to which I have devoted much of my energy 
and thought. For this reason, I have always sought to be an active reviewer based on the reasoning that 
my experience would be grist for the mill of my editorial ambitions. And it has been.  
That does not make me a famous researcher, though; most of you would not even know me if I crossed 
your path at ICIS or AMCIS. It does, however, make me a highly experienced and uniquely insightful 
individual in regards to the vagaries of our scientific review process, and, for that purpose, I commend 
your attention to the issues of the tragedy of the commons in scientific publishing. I wish to instantiate a 
debate about where we go from here because I clearly see that our scientific commons cannot much 
longer support the rising demand for a scarce and valued resource in the form of skilled peer review. I am 
most interested in others’ views on this matter. 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 628  
 
Volume 42  10.17705/1CAIS.04225 Paper 25  
 
References 
Barker, J. L., Barclay, P., & Reeve, H. K. (2012). Within-group competition reduces cooperation and 
payoffs in human groups. Behavioral Ecology, 23(4), 735-741. 
Brown, K. G. (2012). From the editors: Thoughts on effective reviewing. Academy of Management 
Learning & Education, 11(2), 152-154. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248. 
Investopedia. (n.d.). Tragedy of the commons. Retrieved from 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tragedy-of-the-commons.asp 
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 
99-118. 
Smith, A. (1937). The wealth of nations. New York:  The Modern Library. 
Stafford, T. F. (2016). Optimizing the business side of science: Publication review cycles and process 
management considerations. Communications of the AIS, 16, 296-306. 
Tragedy of the commons. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_commons 
  
629 Reviews, Reviewers, and Reviewing: The “Tragedy of the Commons” in the Scientific Publication Process 
 
Volume 42  10.17705/1CAIS.04225 Paper 25  
 
About the Authors 
Thomas F. Stafford is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Information Processing Science, 
University of Oulu, Finland. During his career he has served as a professor at the University of Jyväskylä 
and at the University of Oulu. Before his retirement, he also worked for ten years as a part-time a scientific 
head of INFWEST/INFORTE programs, which are joint efforts of a number of Finnish universities to 
support doctoral studies in IT. Juhani has also served in various editorial positions in IS journal, including 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems, European Journal of Information Systems, 
Information Systems, Information Systems and e-Business Management, Information Technology and 
People, Journal of the Association for Information Systems, MIS Quarterly, and Scandinavian Journal of 
Information Systems. His research has broadly focused on the theoretical foundations of information 
systems, IS development methods and approaches, organizational analysis, implementation and accept-
ance of information systems, and design science research in IS. He has published in journals such as 
Communications of the ACM, Communications of the AIS, Data Base, European Journal of Information 
Systems, Information & Management, Information & Software Technology, Information Systems, In-
formation Systems Journal, Information Systems Research, International Journal of Information 























Copyright © 2018 by the Association for Information Systems. Permission to make digital or hard copies of 
all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not 
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and full citation on 
the first page. Copyright for components of this work owned by others than the Association for Information 
Systems must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on 
servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific permission and/or fee. Request permission to 
publish from: AIS Administrative Office, P.O. Box 2712 Atlanta, GA, 30301-2712 Attn: Reprints or via e-
mail from publications@aisnet.org. 
